Cañon de San Diego Land Grant (Part 3 of 3)

Court of Private Land Claims (CPLC) Case (1893-1897)

On February 17, 1893, the parties claiming the smaller portion of the Cañon de San Diego land grant filed a claim with the CPLC. They were: Amado Chávez ((A4(1)b1), Román Baca (A4(2)b), F. Manzanares, Agustín del Valle (B3(2)a), Florencio Sandoval, Josefita García, Teodosio Ortiz, Leonor Varela, Juanita Varela and Sofia Varela. The defendants were: the United States, Charles H. Gildersleeve, Mariano S. Otero and Francisco Perea.

Bernard S. Rodey, attorney for Francisco Perea and the other defendants, filed a response to the claim on their behalf. The response reiterated the history of the grant, but contended that the larger grant included the tract described in the plaintiffs’ petition with no exception of any kind. They also reasoned that since the original grantees Francisco and Antonio García de Noriega had joined with the other families in taking possession of the 1798 community land grant, they had renounced any earlier claims. Furthermore, any subsequent claim approved by the surveyor general was null and void because the official had no authority to approve any claim for land within a tract already confirmed by Congress. In July 1893, the US Attorney, Matt G. Reynolds, also filed a response to the plaintiffs’ claim echoing these same arguments.

On August 2, 1893, the CPLC began hearings in the case. An expert witness for the plaintiffs, Will M. Tipton, testified regarding the provenance and authenticity of the original grant documents. A number of witnesses were then called who gave testimony regarding their knowledge about the land grant, the family and descendants of Francisco and Antonio García de Noriega, where they had lived, the boundaries of the grant and whether or not their descendants had continued to live on the grant. The defense attempted to show that Antonio García de Noriega had not actually lived on the smaller grant but south of it, and that from 1837-1843 nobody was living in the Cañon de San Diego because of Apache incursions.

One witness, Juan Martín, provided more detail about the original 1788 grant papers. He said that Nerio Montoya (B1(1)b), who was married to his sister, had initially discounted the value of the papers but one day he showed them to a priest, Father Valencia, who had come to the house. Father Valencia had told Agustín del Valle (B3(2)a), “take this paper, it will be worth something to you someday.”

Bernard S. Rodey, testifying for the defense, provided evidence that the earlier grant had been subsumed under the larger grant. He had bought land near the hot springs, from Juan Francisco Archuleta and his wife in 1887. He produced the deed and said that he had received it without any knowledge of the small grant.

The CPLC issued its opinion on August 14, 1893, with a 3-2 majority finding that the petition should be dismissed, thereby voiding the claims of the smaller 1788 grant. They reasoned that the original title was incomplete because there was no proof that it was cultivated for four years, nor was it subsequently confirmed by any government officer, as required by Spanish law at the time. Moreover, the García brothers had abandoned their rights under the earlier grant, if there were any, for they had participated in the community land grant petition in 1798. The geographic boundaries described by the larger grant clearly included the smaller grant, and by accepting the allotment of 300 varas during the act of possession and not making any protest regarding the amount of land received, they effectively relinquished any prior claims. The majority also argued that if their grant had been separate from the new grant, there would have been no reason for them to accept a portion of land under the new grant, nor would they have allowed the boundaries of the grant to be described in such a way that it included their smaller portion. Lastly, the 1808 judgment of Governor Manrique purporting to confirm the earlier grant was not a judicial act, as no hearing or notice to other settlers took place. Therefore, it could not be construed as having reconfirmed the smaller grant.

Justices Murray and Stone dissented from the majority opinion. Justice Murray argued that the community land grant petition of 1798 specifically asked for vacant land. There was nothing in the statement that suggested the governor awarding the larger grant had concluded that the Garcías had abandoned their rights under the 1788 land, as the land they possessed was not vacant. To the contrary, they explicitly did not surrender their rights by asking the new grantees to acknowledge their rights under their prior grant, which all present affirmed. Governor Chacon, in 1798, had no power to rescind a grant that had already been given by his predecessor in 1788 and distribute it to the community land grantees. Furthermore, the record showed that the grantees and their descendants had been in possession of the land for more than a century. When Governor Manrique ruled on the question of title in 1808, he was the competent official to judge whether or not the Garcías had abandoned their rights by joining in the community land grant petition. His conclusion was that the Garcías had the better title to the land and only the royal audiencia in Guadalajara had the power to annul their rights.

The dissent concluded by drawing upon case precedents, such as that of Earl B. Coe vs. the United States, in which the Supreme Court ruled that  “under principles established by the Supreme Court in many kindred cases it is not our duty to... explore the proceedings of the officials making the sale in search of technical flaws and omissions... On the contrary, we deem it our duty to give to these proceedings and the laws under which they were had a fair, reasonable and liberal interpretation in favor of upholding titles issued by competent authority and upon the faith of which such large sums of money have been expended... The grantees and their descendants have been in undisturbed possession for more than a hundred years, and while it does not appear that large sums of money have been expended by them, their rights are not to be disregarded on that account; they have endured hardships and privations incident to a life on the frontier, continually watching and guarding their families against the almost daily attacks of savages, and it is to this class of citizens that we are indebted, more than any others, for the benefits of civilization enjoyed by the people of this section of the country.”

Justice Stone wrote a concurring dissent agreeing with these points and making an additional observation. The key assumption upon which the court based its judgment was that the García brothers had abandoned the smaller grant by participating in the larger grant. The facts and circumstances presented show the opposite—that the Garcías protested any relinquishment of earlier rights and the other grantees assented to their rights under the first grant. Furthermore, the two grants were very different: the first grant was one of absolute title (which could be sold) while the second was a conditional possessory life-estate (which could not be sold, only passed down to heirs). It seemed clear, therefore, that the “two grants were, and were intended and understood to be, two separate and distinct grants, with separate and different titles, estates and grantees; neither depending upon or affecting the other.” There is no reason why the brothers had to relinquish rights under the first grant in order to receive additional parcels of adjoining land.

Amado Chávez and the other plaintiffs filed an appeal with the US Supreme Court, which affirmed the ruling of the CPLC on November 15, 1897. The court argued that the García brothers had not lived on or cultivated the land from the 1788 grant, but south of it. They conceded that while alcalde Armenta seemed to have protected the rights of the García brother under their former grant, he had no right to grant any exceptions without consulting the governor and there was no evidence that he had done so. Moreover, the document was not attested by witnesses, as required for official documents. They also stated that the other settlers simply agreed not to disturb the particular land that the Garcías were cultivating, which was not within the boundaries of the 1788 grant. This last point seems a strange assertion, as it would mean the Garcías were cultivating land that did not belong to them and if that were the case, why then would they need to enlist Armenta’s help in protecting their rights to land that was not theirs to claim under the earlier grant?

With respect to the 1808 communications between alcalde Vergara and Governor Manrique, the court agreed with the CPLC and declared the correspondence to be entirely ex parte, without knowledge of the other settlers, and not a judicial action. Yet this interpretation flies in the face of a plain reading of the exchange. The governor deemed that no judicial action was necessary, as the Garcías’ title was entirely clear. It is curious that the court made no mention of the fact that Congress had already patented the larger grant. It seems this would have been the easiest way to uphold the CPLC’s decision. One wonders if it would have been possible to protest a patent that had been granted without a full review of competing titles. In any case, the facts of the case show that the CPLC and the Supreme Court erred in their judgment, depriving the heirs of the García brothers of their land rights in the Cañon de San Diego.

Note: the source of the information regarding the history of the grant can be found in the New Mexico State Archives, Land Grant Case Files, Court of Private Land Claims Case No. 100 and Survey General Reports Nos. 25 & 122.